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NO CALLING CUT:  THE POLITICAL RIGHT TO RECORD 
POLICE 
Elizabeth J. Frawley 
On February 15, 2014, Shawn Thomas witnessed and began re-
cording New York Police Officer Efrain Rojas making an arrest at a 
subway station.1  All indications show that Thomas was a safe distance 
away, approximately thirty feet, when Rojas retaliated by video re-
cording Thomas.2  Rojas approached Thomas, shoving his camera in 
Thomas’s face, and the two began arguing.3  Thomas eventually ac-
cused Rojas of invading his personal space; Rojas accused Thomas of 
the same thing.4  A sudden skip in the video occurred.5  The next im-
age was of Rojas and presumably Shawn Thomas outside.6  Rojas was 
pressing Thomas against the snow-covered ground.7  A third person 
had taken over the camera, recording Rojas as he arrested Thomas.8  
Thomas was charged with resisting arrest, trespassing, disorderly 
conduct, and obstructing government.9 
Thomas’s story is not, at its core, unusual.  A quick internet search 
can provide numerous videos of police officers aggressively approach-
ing civilians who happen to record the officers in the course of their 
public duties.10  Officers’ reactions range from the one seen in 
 
*  J.D. Candidate 2015, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  I am grateful for the assis-
tance and contributions of Professor David Rudovsky, who acted as a faculty supervisor on 
this project.  I am also thankful for the significant work from the University of Pennsylva-
nia Journal of Constitutional Law editors.  
1  Andrea Park, VIDEO: NYPD Officer Allegedly Assaults Man For Recording Arrest on Phone, 
METRO (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.metro.us/newyork/news/local/2014/02/19/video-
nypd-officer-allegedly-assaults-man-for-recording-arrest-on-phone/; Thomas Tracy, 
VIDEO: Cop Allegedly Assaults Man Recording Him in Brooklyn Subway Station, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS (Feb. 19, 2014, 3:23 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/brooklyn/
allegedly-assaults-man-recording-article-1.1620037. 
 2 Park, supra note 1.  
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 See, e.g., Copwatch News, Kentucky Cops Detain Man for “Suspicion of Terrorist Activity” for Vid-
eo Recording Police Station, YOUTUBE (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_
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Thomas’s case, ultimately leading to the recorder’s arrest, to simply 
approaching the civilian recorder and inquiring as to what he or she 
was doing and why. 
Arrests of civilian recorders are by no means unusual.  Cases sur-
rounding civilian recorders being arrested and charged with viola-
tions of privacy,11 harassment,12 or wiretapping13 statutes have begun 
peppering the district courts and even reaching the circuit courts.  
Over the past decade, four circuits have decided cases in which a civil-
ian recorder was arrested or forced to cease recording.  The record-
ers, believing this to be a violation of their First Amendment rights, 
filed claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.14  The decisions collectively 
indicate that there is a firmly established First Amendment right to 
record police officers, but that courts are only starting to address the 
Fourth Amendment concerns.  While the recorder does have a First 
Amendment right to record, the right overlaps with Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence dictating the reactions permissible by law en-
forcement officers.  In addition, the right to record cannot be so lim-
itless as to allow recorders to directly interfere with law enforcement. 
This Comment will explore the First Amendment rights of the ci-
vilian recorder, taking into consideration reasonable limitations and 
police officer reactions.  Part I considers the current circuit decisions 
 
va1ioLMxFQ at 0:50–1:15, 4:15-4:50 (depicting an officer explain that taking photographs 
or pictures of a police building is a suspicious activity relating to terrorist activities and 
creates fear for an officer’s safety); Jay Kelly, Harassed by Boston Police for Taking Video, 
YOUTUBE (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zaF2u9G-jXE (showing 
Boston Police officers harassing a recorder for endangering a plainclothes police officer 
and interfering with an investigation despite other civilians being allowed to walk near-
by); Digby Jones, California Deputy Detains Man for Video Recording Arrest, Accusing Him of 
Possbly Plotting Murder, YOUTUBE (June 13, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=pk0
jjs-VUyQ (showing an officer approaching a bystander, detaining him, and asking for ID 
for recording an arrest); stopthenewworldorder_now.com, Police Harass Children for Film-
ing Police, YOUTUBE (May 22, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H0KNRiliVDM 
(seemingly depicting an officer forcibly removing a camera phone from an individual). 
 11 See, e.g., Johnson v. Hawe, 388 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2004) (refusing to grant an officer 
qualified immunity for arresting an individual under the State of Washington’s Privacy 
Act). 
 12 See, e.g., Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 538–40 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (reviewing 
the previous conviction of a man for harassment after he videorecorded Pennsylvania 
state troopers, whom the man believed were inspecting trucks in an unsafe manner). 
 13 See, e.g., Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 79 (1st Cir. 2011) (discussing a Massachusetts 
man’s arrest for violating state wiretap statutes after videorecording Boston police officers 
making an arrest); Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 964 (Mass. 2001) (discussing 
a citizen’s arrest for video recording that occurred during a traffic stop). 
 14 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides for a civil right of action when an individual acting under the 
color of the law deprives a citizen or person within the jurisdiction of the United States of 
his Constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).  
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surrounding Right to Record cases and examines a balanced ap-
proach between viewpoints.  Part II examines the First Amendment 
right to record as part of a right to gather public information.  Part 
III examines realistic limitations and concerns surrounding the right 
to record, including the intersection with the Fourth Amendment. 
I.  CURRENT CIRCUIT DECISIONS 
The following part examines the current circuit court decisions 
surrounding the right to record.  As the public has become increas-
ingly saturated by smart phones, and cameras record almost every as-
pect of our lives, courts have begun to address the First Amendment 
concerns posed by arrests and limitations on the civilian video re-
cording of police officers in the course of their public duties. At the 
time of the drafting of this Comment, the First, Third, Ninth and 
Eleventh Circuits have all faced the issue, each taking a slightly dif-
ferent approach in interpretation. 
A.  First Circuit – A Right to Record Matters of Public Interest 
The First Circuit addressed the issue of the citizen-recorder in the 
2011 case of Glik v. Cunniffe.15  The court was faced with a 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 suit for violation of civil rights after Simon Glik, a Massachusetts 
resident, was arrested and charged with wiretapping16 for video and 
audio recording three police officers arresting a young man.17  Glik 
recorded the interaction on his personal cell phone from about ten 
feet away, not otherwise interacting with the officers.  While the wire-
tapping charges were eventually dismissed, Glik believed the arrest 
violated his First Amendment Rights. 
The First Circuit found that “[t]he filming of government officials 
engaged in their duties in a public place, including police officers 
performing their responsibilities, fits comfortably within” the pro-
tected First Amendment principles of gathering and disseminating 
information.18  In reaching its conclusion, the court looked to the 
 
 15 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 16 Id. at 80; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(C)(1) (2014) (“Except as otherwise specif-
ically provided in this section any person who willfully commits an interception, attempts 
to commit an interception, or procures any other person to commit an interception or to 
attempt to commit an interception of any wire or oral communication shall be fined not 
more than ten thousand dollars, or imprisoned in the state prison for not more than five 
years, or imprisoned in a jail or house of correction for not more than two and one half 
years, or both so fined and given one such imprisonment.”). 
 17 Glik, 655 F.3d at 79. 
 18 Id. at 82. 
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rights of a citizen recorder and equated them with the rights of the 
press.19  The First Circuit then looked to surrounding jurisdictions to 
reach the conclusion that there was a First Amendment right to rec-
ord the actions of police officers in public spaces, drawing heavily on 
the importance of discourse pertaining to government affairs.20 
B.  Third Circuit – Reasonable Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions 
In Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle,21 the Third Circuit addressed a quali-
fied immunity claim22 for officers who stopped Brian Kelly, a passen-
ger in a vehicle, from recording the routine traffic stop.23  Kelly ha-
bitually carried a hand-held video camera and began recording a 
Pennsylvania police officer,24 who had stopped the driver for speeding 
and a bumper height violation.25  The police officer asked Kelly to re-
linquish the camera, believing this to be a violation of wiretapping 
statutes.  Kelly complied.26  After consulting with a district attorney, 
the officer arrested Kelly for violating Pennsylvania’s Wiretap Act.27  
The officer asked for bail and held Kelly in prison for 27 hours.28  
Charges were eventually dropped, but Kelly pursued a § 1983 suit al-
leging the police officers violated his First Amendment right to rec-
ord and Fourth Amendment right to be free from arrest lacking in 
probable cause.29 
 
 19 Id. at 83. 
 20 Id. at 83–84. 
 21 622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 22 An individual who is facing a § 1983 suit for violation of rights can claim qualified im-
munity as a defense.  Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability 
when their conduct does not clearly violate a Constitutional right.  If there was no consti-
tutional right, or if the right was not clearly established at the time of the violation, the 
government official is freed from liability and any resulting damages.  See Anderson v. 
Creighton, 438 U.S. 635, 638 (1987) (noting that the defense arose out of “conflicting 
concerns” for, on the one hand, a victim’s right to meaningful relief and for, on the oth-
er, the societal costs of allowing damage suits against public officials); Harlow v. Fitzger-
ald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982) (noting at the outset of its analysis that the Court’s “deci-
sions consistently have held that government officials are entitled to some form of 
immunity from suits for damages”). 
 23 Kelly, 622 F.3d at 251–52. 
 24 There is some dispute about whether the camera was in plain sight the entire time.  Id. at 
251.  This dispute is immaterial to the First Amendment question. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 251–52; see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5701–5782. 
 28 Kelly, 622 F.3d at 252. 
 29 Id. 
Oct. 2014] NO CALLING CUT 291 
 
The Third Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment for the police officer based on qualified immunity.30  In ex-
amining whether there was Fourth Amendment probable cause to ar-
rest under the wiretapping statute, the court considered whether the 
officer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his actions with 
Kelly, making it a private conversation.31  The court vacated the of-
ficer’s summary judgment with respect to qualified immunity, re-
manding for additional fact-finding.32 
The Third Circuit also reviewed the First Amendment claim, 
which the district court dismissed as not clearly established.33  Look-
ing to the surrounding circuit court decisions, the Third Circuit not-
ed the right to record matters of public concern is still subject to the 
limitations of reasonable time, place and manner.34  In a previous 
Third Circuit decision, Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Township of West White-
land,35 reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions led the court 
to allow the prohibition of video recording town hall meetings, be-
cause the act of gathering information in the context of the First 
Amendment allowed note-taking as a reasonable manner restriction 
as opposed to video recording.36  Due to the Whiteland Woods deci-
sion,37 amongst others, the Third Circuit found that the right to rec-
ord was not clearly established, upholding the grant of qualified im-
munity on the First Amendment issue.38 
 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 258.  The Court considered the expectation of privacy not as a part of the First 
Amendment issue, but based on the language of the statute.  The Wiretapping statute on-
ly prohibits the interception of oral communications possessing an expectation that the 
communication not be intercepted.  See id. at 257; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5702–03. 
 32 Kelly, 622 F.3d at 259. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 262.  Time, place, and manner restrictions are common First Amendment limita-
tions.  Those engaged in conduct covered by the First Amendment can still be limited in 
reasonable, content-neutral ways that dictate the time frame, location, and manner of 
communication.  This is discussed more in Part III, infra.  See also Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“Our cases make clear . . . that even in a public forum 
the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of pro-
tected speech . . . .”). 
 35 193 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 36 Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262. 
 37 Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Township of W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177 (3rd. Cir. 1999) 
 38 Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262–263. 
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C.  The Ninth Circuit – No Clearly Established Interpretation of the State 
Statute 
The Ninth Circuit in 1995 offered a much more limited approach 
when deciding Fordyce v. City of Seattle.39 Jerry Edmond Fordyce was 
video recording a Seattle protest, including police officers and civil-
ian bystanders, for local television.40 After being arrested under Wash-
ington privacy statutes, which were later dismissed after a night in jail, 
Fordyce filed a § 1983 civil rights claim.41  The district court granted 
summary judgment based on qualified immunity.42  The Circuit Court 
rejected qualified immunity for the First Amendment claims, re-
manding them for trial.43  It then upheld a grant of qualified immuni-
ty for the arrest, basing its decision on the state law that prohibited 
recording private conversations.44  The court found that, at the time 
of arrest, it was not sufficiently clear if conversations in public consti-
tuted private conversations for the purpose of the statute.45  The 
Ninth Circuit therefore upheld the grant of qualified immunity with 
respect to the arrest under the Fourth Amendment. 
D.  Eleventh Circuit – Reasonable Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions 
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Smith v. City of Cumming upheld 
a grant of summary judgment in favor of police officers who prevent-
ed James and Barbara Smith from video recording the officers in 
public.46  The court stated: 
 As to the First Amendment claim under Section 1983, we agree with 
the Smiths that they had a First Amendment right, subject to reasonable 
time, manner and place restrictions, to photograph or videotape police 
conduct.47 
Yet, the court found the police officers’ actions did not violate this 
right, despite an allegation of police officers preventing video record-
ing.48 
 
 39 55 F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 40 Id. at 438. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 438–39. 
 43 Id. at 439. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 212 F.3d 1332, 1332–33. (11th Cir. 2000). 
 47 Id. at 1333. 
 48 Id. at 1332–33.  No additional factual information was provided to clarify how the officers 
prevented the Smiths from recording.  The Court provided no information to reconcile 
the claim that the officers stopped the Smiths with the statement that the Smiths “have 
not shown that the [officers’] actions violated that right.”  Id. 
Oct. 2014] NO CALLING CUT 293 
 
*** 
With the variations among courts, which approach should domi-
nate, and what, if anything, can police officers do in response to civil-
ian recording?  The common theme amongst the courts is granting 
of the right to record in limited circumstances.  The exception to this 
is the First Circuit, which used broad language and looked to the di-
minished privacy in public locations and the importance of the type 
of speech.  None of the courts have been willing to throw open the 
police station doors to civilians with cameras in hand.  Yet, the police 
actions that occur on public streets are readily available for all to see.  
Adding a video recorder only alters the calculus in that it creates an 
arguably objective record of the events. 
This approach recognizes that the public has a legitimate interest 
in monitoring and observing the activities of police officers as gov-
ernment officials.  It encompasses the First Circuit’s belief that there 
is a right to record, but that the right extends only to public places, a 
reasonable place restriction. 
There is, however, also a legitimate interest in protecting officers 
from violence and police investigations from intrusions stemming 
from recorders.  While these are common concerns, the balance rests 
on allowing civilians to record officers performing their duties when 
officers are in public and can be personally observed.  There also 
must be recognition that the legal activity of recording is not shielded 
from reactions or from arousing suspicions of illegal activity in some 
contexts.  The act of video recording, although constitutionally pro-
tected, can be considered in the probable cause and reasonable sus-
picion analyses on behalf of the officers. 
II.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS OF POLITICAL SPEECH 
The primary concern of the courts mentioned above in assessing 
these cases has been Freedom of Speech and the Press.  The First 
Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”49  Despite the two sepa-
rate phrases for speech and press and a contentious debate among 
academics,50 it has been determined that both provisions encompass 
 
 49 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The First Amendment was made applicable to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 318 U.S. 105, 108 (1943). 
 50 Compare Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1027–28 (2011) 
(arguing that treating freedom of the press and freedom of speech equally creates an im-
permissible redundancy in phrasing), with Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an In-
dustry, or for the Press as a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 462–
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the same general right to expression, with members of the press be-
ing awarded no greater rights than those of the public.51  The First 
Amendment focus is well-founded and the primary concern that 
should arise when discussing the suppression of video recording of 
police officers and dissemination of information surrounding gov-
ernment actors.  This part will discuss (a) the appropriate level of 
scrutiny with this type of issue; (b) the right to gather information 
under the First Amendment, specifically in the context of an overly 
vague and often-ignored case; and (c) film as a specifically protected 
medium of First Amendment activity.  In conclusion, this part will 
find that there is a right to record government officials as part of the 
First Amendment. 
A. Judicial Scrutiny of Speech Regulations and Police as Government Actors 
Exacting scrutiny should be applied when considering limitations 
to the right to record.  It has been determined that the First Amend-
ment “was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the 
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the peo-
ple.”52  The very core of this amendment is political speech, receiving 
the strongest protections amongst the various categories of speech.53  
This rationale stems from the concept of a well-informed electorate 
 
63 (2012) (arguing that the Framers considered the press to be a form of technology and 
were attempting to “secur[e] the right of every person to use communications technolo-
gy, and not just securing a right belonging exclusively to members of the publishing in-
dustry”). 
 51 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1978); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 
850 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833–34 (1974); Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, 
435 U.S. 589, 608–09 (1978). 
 52 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); see also Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 
101–02 (“The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution em-
braces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public con-
cern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.  The exigencies of the 
colonial period and the efforts to secure freedom from oppressive administration devel-
oped a broadened conception of these liberties as adequate to supply the public need for 
information and education with respect to the significant issues of the times. . . . Freedom 
of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues 
about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to 
cope with the exigencies of their period.”). 
 53 See Buckley v. Valeo, 42 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1976) (finding that financial contributions are a 
form of political speech which is at the very core of the First Amendment); N.Y. Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (finding that a higher standard of intent is needed in 
libel cases when the plaintiff is a public official because the First Amendment was de-
signed to facilitate the dissemination of information about public officials); R.A.V. v. City 
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Our First Amendment decisions 
have created a rough hierarchy in the constitutional protection of speech.  Core political 
speech occupies the highest, most protected position . . . .”). 
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creating political accountability for those that allegedly serve them.54  
While the formal law requires a strict scrutiny of content-based 
speech restrictions,55 and intermediate scrutiny surrounding content-
neutral restrictions,56 the public interest in gauging government ac-
tions is so high and historically ingrained that even the review of con-
tent-neutral regulations of speech pertaining to government actors 
can begin to look more like strict scrutiny and is sometimes referred 
to as “exacting scrutiny.”57  For example, the Supreme Court requires 
a higher standard of intent in libel suits brought for defamation of a 
public figure’s character so as to not chill the conversation surround-
ing government and politics.58  While the law at issue in Sullivan was 
content-neutral, the concern over free speech and government offi-
cials required heightened sensitivity.  The stakes are simply higher 
when pertaining to government actions and actors, those very people 
that are supposed to be acting on the citizen’s behalf and with their 
consent. 
The restrictions on the right to record, like the libel statutes, are 
content neutral but also encompass the political speech that the First 
 
 54 This idea has been foreshadowed in Justice Powell’s dissent in Saxbe: 
What is at stake here is the societal function of the First Amendment in preserving 
free public discussion of governmental affairs.  No aspect of that constitutional 
guarantee is more rightly treasured than its protection of the ability of our people 
through free and open debate to consider and resolve their own desti-
ny. . . . “[The] First Amendment is one of the vital bulwarks of our national com-
mitment to intelligent self-government.”   It embodies our Nation’s commitment 
to popular self-determination and our abiding faith that the surest course for de-
veloping sound national policy lies in a free exchange of views on public issues.  
And public debate must not only be unfettered; it must also be informed.  For that 
reason this Court has repeatedly stated that First Amendment concerns encompass 
the receipt of information and ideas as well as the right of free expression. 
  417 U.S. at 862–63 (Powell, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).  See also Stromberg 
v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (“The maintenance of the opportunity for free po-
litical discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people 
and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the securi-
ty of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.”). 
 55 See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S.Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014) (stating that restrictions that are not 
content neutral “must satisfy strict scrutiny—that is, it must be the least restrictive means 
of achieving a compelling state interest”); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 
622, 653–55 (1994) (describing the level of scrutiny as “strict” for any conferred benefit 
or punishment based on the content of a message) (citing Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. 
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1 
(1986)). 
 56 See Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 642 (“[R]egulations that are unrelated to the content of 
speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny.”). 
 57 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (“When a law burdens 
core political speech, we apply ‘exacting scrutiny,’ and we uphold the restriction only if it 
is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.”). 
 58 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 268–69. 
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Amendment strives to keep unfettered.  Police officers possess an 
immense amount of power and an immense potential for abuse.59  
They are the government actors we are most likely to encounter, and 
that proximity creates a desire for close monitoring and accountabil-
ity worthy of the highest level of judicial scrutiny—exacting scrutiny 
under which the law can only stand when it is narrowly tailored for an 
important government interest. 
B. The Right to Gather Information as Part of the First Amendment 
The First Amendment Freedom of Speech and the Press, in the 
case of the civilian recorder and most other political communication, 
would be hollow if there was no implicit right to gather information.  
In recognition of this, the Supreme Court has found within the First 
Amendment a right to access, receive, and gather information.  This 
“structural model”60 protects the First Amendment by protecting 
those seeking out news, and ensuring that they are not arbitrarily cut 
off from normally accessible information.61  This right to gather is by 
no means absolute,62 yet “[t]here is an undoubted right to gather 
news ‘from any source by means within the law.’”63 
Within the context of the First Amendment right to record, this 
presents no unique problem to the citizen recorder.  Surely the re-
corder has a right to use his or her sense of sight and to access public 
places.64  While the recorder would not have the right to request en-
 
 59 See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 453, 455–56 (2004) (explaining that the “distinctive and influential organizational 
culture” of police offices “bears significant responsibility for police misbehavior”). 
 60 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J., con-
curring) (“But the First Amendment embodies more than a commitment to free expres-
sion and communicative interchange for their own sakes, it has a structural role to play in 
securing and fostering our republican system of self-government.”). 
 61 See id. at 576–77 (finding a right to gather information at criminal trials should be pro-
tected from arbitrary foreclosure because they were historically open to the public); 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (“We do not question the significance of 
free speech, press, or assembly to the country’s welfare.  Nor is it suggested that news 
gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for 
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”). 
 62 See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1978) (finding that there is no right to 
access all sources of information within government control, specifically within secure 
prison systems); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (upholding a ban on passports to Cuba, 
because national safety is of greater importance than the gathering of information first-
hand). 
 63 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 11 (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681–82). 
 64 In fact, a whole range of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence exists on this assumption, 
allowing officers to make warrantless arrests in public, and seize evidence in plain view.  
Limiting the public access to see and document this information would then have to cre-
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trance to police files and offices, the recorder would be allowed to 
gather the information projected to the public and readily accessible 
for all to see.  Yet, problems exist in (1) the right to observe arrests 
and (2) the right to gather information through a specific type of 
medium:  film. 
1.  The Often-Ignored Problem of Colten:  No Right to Observe Without 
Something More 
Particularly important within the Right to Record and gathering 
information context is a case seemingly forgotten by recent Circuit 
Court decisions:  Colten v. Kentucky.65  The case has thus far been ig-
nored by the circuit courts, but explicitly rejected a First Amendment 
right to observe police actions.66  If there is no right to visually ob-
serve an arrest as police activity, then there would likely be no right to 
video record either. 
In Colten, one car amongst a procession of vehicles was pulled over 
for a legal traffic stop.67  Drivers following, including Colten, pulled 
off the highway, many leaving their cars.68  The large gathering of cars 
caused additional officers to stop, blocking one lane of the highway 
and causing traffic to back up.69  Colten approached the initial officer 
several times to arrange for transportation of passengers and watch 
the officer; he was asked to return to his car and leave the scene.70  
When Colten remained, he was charged with disorderly conduct for 
“congregat[ing] with other persons in a public place and refus[ing] 
to comply with a lawful order of the police to disperse” while intend-
ing to cause a public inconvenience.71  In a challenge to his charges, 
Colten claimed that he was engaged in the First Amendment activities 
of disseminating and receiving information relating to the issuance of 
a traffic citation.72  The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, find-
ing that the officers had a legitimate interest in enforcing traffic laws 
and were reasonably worried that the procession of cars on the side 
 
ate a limitation in the actions of police officers, who only derive their rights to act on and 
consider evidence based on a known lack of privacy. 
 65  407 U.S. 104 (1972). 
 66 Id. at 109 (noting that the arrangement for transportation and observation of the issu-
ance of a traffic citation was not disseminating or receiving information, and therefore 
was not under the protection of the First Amendment). 
 67 Id. at 106. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 106–07. 
 71 Id. at 108. 
 72 Id. at 109. 
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would be a danger to those parked and to other motorists.  There-
fore, the argument was a “strained, near-frivolous contention” and 
the conduct “was not, without more, protected by the First Amend-
ment.”73 
Colten, when read too narrowly, seems to create a limitation for 
the Right to Record advocates, but can easily be explained in the con-
text of the prevailing Right to Record decisions.  When examining 
the facts, Colten aligns most clearly with the reasonable time, place, 
and manner rationalization of the Eleventh Circuit.  Impeding the 
flow of traffic and interfering with the officer’s issuing of a citation is 
not a reasonable manner of observing an arrest.  Yet, it was the very 
act of observing that Colten did not have a right to “without more.”74  
Colten can fit within the prevailing Right to Record decisions if (a) it 
declares that the right to observe is not absolute and is subject to rea-
sonable limitations; or (b) an individual has no right to observe, but 
the act of recording is the something “more” that the Court needed 
to find First Amendment protection. 
a.  Colten Dealt with the Unique Situation of an Observer Actually 
Obstructing an Officer From the Performance of His or Her Duties 
One possible explanation of Colten in the right to gather infor-
mation and Right to Record context is that the court was less clear on 
this issue than we now wish they were or was engaged in some faulty 
reasoning.  Colten’s observance of the arrest was not the issue.  In-
stead, the issue was doing so on a public highway and with a sufficient 
number of people as to limit the use of the road.  The courts have 
“consistently recognized the strong interest of state and local gov-
ernments in regulating the use of their streets and other public plac-
es.”75  Even in the infamous case of Martin Luther King Jr.’s civil 
rights marches in Birmingham, the Supreme Court recognized the 
need to monitor highways with reasonable regulations: 
 Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the exist-
ence of an organized society maintaining public order without which lib-
erty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses.  The au-
thority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the 
safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has 
never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one 
 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967). 
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of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately 
depend.76 
Very similarly, Colten’s valid interest in gathering information under 
the First Amendment did not create unbridled access at the cost of 
reasonable safety and transportation regulations.  Colten had a right 
to be in a publicly accessible place, and he clearly had a right to use 
his senses and see what was occurring around him.  However, Colten 
could not exercise his First Amendment rights in any way he so de-
sired.  His rights remained subject to a larger body of law governing 
time, place, and manner. 
When understood as a case balancing First Amendment rights 
with public safety, Colten seems more reasonably adapted within the 
circuit court decisions.  Civilians have a right to record, but no right 
is absolute and shielded from inconveniences.  The Eleventh Circuit, 
although not abundantly clear in the acceptable limitations, correctly 
identified that speech is subject to reasonable time, place, and man-
ner restrictions.  For Colten, his manner was blocking the flow of traf-
fic and creating a risk of an accident while engaging the officer in 
conversation, ultimately distracting the officer from his legal actions.  
It was not the observation that was the problem; it was the manner 
Colten chose to observe. 
b.  Observation Does Not Merit First Amendment Protection, but the 
Act of Recording is Additional Speech Activity Worthy of Protection 
Colten can also be reconciled with current Right to Record deci-
sions by claiming that the act of recording creates the higher level of 
protection under the First Amendment.  The Colten court stated, 
“Colten’s conduct in refusing to move on after being directed to do 
so was not, without more, protected by the First Amendment.”77  Col-
ten’s reasoning for not moving was based on a desire to arrange 
transportation and observe the issuance of a citation, seemingly insuf-
ficient under the first amendment “without more.” 
When attempting to reconcile this with current Right to Record 
decisions, it is possible that the act of recording constitutes the some-
thing “more” to which the court referred.  This approach has re-
ceived at least some support.  Mario Cerame, in considering Colten in 
the context of recording officers in Connecticut, believes that the 
critical difference may be the presence of a device that can capture 
 
 76 Id. at 316 (citing Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941)). 
 77 Colten, 407 U.S. at 109. 
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and publish the events.78  Respectfully, the observation could have just 
as easily been written in a newspaper article or a book, presented at a 
defense hearing, or orally repeated to others at a later time, and it 
would have been equally protected under the First Amendment but 
only required visual observation like that in Colten.  It is hard to imag-
ine that the gathering of information for a book or newspaper, which 
may only require observation as opposed to video, would receive dif-
ferent levels of protection. 
As discussed in the part immediately below, an individual’s choice 
in how to gather information is an additional First Amendment issue 
of concern in Right to Record cases. 
c.  Choice of Information-Gathering Medium as a First Amendment 
Issue:  The Right to Film over Simple Observation 
Once it is accepted that individuals have a right to use their bio-
logical senses to gather information openly accessible to all through 
every day observation, the right to do so by means of video recording 
must be addressed.  The act of recording is, in itself, expressive activi-
ty protected under the First Amendment.  While the act of taking a 
video may be seen as non-expressive physical act of simply standing 
and holding a camera, the video being produced conveys a message.79  
In Right to Record cases, it is a political message. 
Film, either moving or still, has previously been recognized as a 
protected First Amendment medium, even in the most unlikely of 
cases.  In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,80 the Supreme Court struck 
down a blanket ban on sexually explicit images that appeared to de-
pict children, although they were generated without the use of and 
harm to children.81  In discussing the issue of depicting children in 
sexual scenarios, the court implicitly endorsed the movies “Traffic” 
and “American Beauty” as within the realm of First Amendment 
 
 78 Mario Cerame, The Right to Record Police in Connecticut, 30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 385, 412 
(2012). 
 79 See Cerame, supra note 78, at 414–15 (“The subject, the frame, the angle, the lighting, the 
distance are all intrinsic to the value of the piece, and they are part of on-the-fly editorial 
control that the citizen-recorder exercises.  Imperfections in this chosen medium—the 
blurriness, the rough audio, the shaky camera—add to the work’s authenticity.  The me-
dium itself, often coarse and everyday, enhances the speaker’s message criticizing the es-
tablishment.  Inasmuch as any of these are incidental, they are part of the overall artistic 
choice of medium by the recorder, like Pollock’s paint splashes or Banksy’s street art 
stencils.”). 
 80 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
 81 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 234. 
Oct. 2014] NO CALLING CUT 301 
 
speech.82  The videos were considered to be artistically significant and 
worthy of First Amendment protection that a blanket ban did not 
consider.83  Video therefore acts as a protected media of expression.  
That, naturally, does not mean that it can be produced in whatever 
way desirable, without regard for other laws; it simply means that 
what is being produced while recording has a First Amendment pro-
tection. 
More specifically in Right to Record cases, there is a need to con-
sider the choice between types of expressive mediums.  When the 
Third Circuit decided to grant qualified immunity in Kelly v. Borough 
of Carlisle,84 it noted that it would be a reasonable restriction to permit 
note-taking as opposed to video recording, seemingly implying that it 
may be permissible to ban video recording because some alternative 
in the form of written or oral communications exist.  Yet, there is a 
fundamental difference in video as a medium as opposed to other al-
ternatives. At the heart of most civilian-police interactions brought 
into court lie intense factual disputes.85  Yet, video acts to resolve the-
se disputes, providing an objective representation of events.86  This 
objectivity that occurs with video has been noted as a value not only 
to the civilian recorder, but also to police officers and departments 
 
 82 Id. at 247–48. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 85 Cf. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (considering the justification for use of deadly 
force in a video recorded high-speed car chase given two vastly differing versions of the 
same event); Matthew D. Thurlow, Lights, Camera, Action:  Video Cameras As Tools of Justice, 
23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 771, 808 (2005) (finding that an objective video 
record “eliminates the need for a ‘swearing contest’ in which officers and suspects pre-
sent vastly different stories about what happened”). 
 86 See Scott, 550 U.S. at 372 (finding no factual dispute when the video clearly contradicted 
one version of events); Thurlow, supra note 85, at 808 (finding that an objective video 
record “eliminates the need for a ‘swearing contest’ in which officers and suspects pre-
sent vastly different stories about what happened”); Howard M. Wasserman, Orwell’s Vi-
sion:  Video and the Future of Civil Rights Enforcement, 68 MD. L. REV. 600, 607 (2009) (claim-
ing that videos alter the scope of Section 1983 suits and provide “truthful, unbiased, 
objective, and unambiguous reproduction[s] of reality, deserving of controlling and dis-
positive weight”); Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment:  Memory, 
Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 344 (2011) (“Images, unlike 
words, do not demand great literary ability, or even literacy, for persuasiveness; they pro-
vide apparently robust verification that does not depend on the reputation of the propo-
nent.”). 
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that have adopted mandatory recording procedures87 of interactions 
with civilians.88 
Videos possess a certain credibility because the viewer is seeing it 
as if it were the first time, rather than trusting an individual with his 
own viewpoints, biases, and interests, which might influence the view-
er’s interpretations.  Writing and jotting down notes does not provide 
the same objective viewpoint.  Notes are easily altered or phrased in a 
specific way to invoke an emotional response whereas video displays 
what was within the frame and allows for personal interpretations and 
conclusions.89 
Further problems can be seen with the Third Circuit’s “manner” 
restrictions on recording by noting that simply because there is an al-
ternative does not make a ban on one form reasonable.  Requiring 
video to be forgone for less-reliable note taking requires the adoption 
of a less-credible method of documentation, particularly when there 
is a notable credibility variation between police officers and those 
they interact with,90 and it is rarely a reasonable limitation.  In many 
situations, those interacting with police might not be able to capture 
events that happen faster than one can write.  Alternatively, if the 
proposed recorder is the one interacting with the police, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to comply with police orders, such as putting 
hands behind one’s back, in the air, or producing a license while 
continuing to capture the events. 
The availability of the alternative is influential, but not dispositive.  
Simply looking to alternative forms of expression would allow bans 
on whole categories of expressive, artistic mediums.  It would be 
permissible to eliminate all movies, as books can tell stories just as 
well.  Yet, we find variations between text and images, both with value 
but in different ways. 
 
 87 Thurlow, supra note 85, at 772–75 (discussing the expansion of court-ordered and legisla-
tively mandated police recording between 2004 and 2005). 
 88 Wasserman, supra note 86, at 614 (noting that the recording of police officers protects 
against misrepresentations in civil rights suits against the police department and police 
misconduct more generally); Thurlow, supra note 85, at 810–12 (2005) (noting that po-
lice and prosecutors receive the greatest advantages from recording by allowing officers 
to refrain from taking notes, use the videos in training new recruits, and deter defendants 
from filing unmeritorious suppression claims). 
 89 Cf. Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Be-
lieve?  Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 838 (2009) 
(finding that various people will interpret an objective video in different ways based on 
their cultural background, and that these variations in interpretation would be reflected 
in the recounting of the events). 
 90 See Cerame, supra note 78, at 396 (noting that courts and juries are more likely to believe 
police officer testimony as credible). 
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For these reasons, video holds a unique value compared to other 
methods of gathering and disseminating information.  Specific limi-
tations allowing individuals to take notes on police actions in ex-
change for forgoing video recording cease to be reasonable time, 
place, and manner restrictions. 
III.  REASONABLE LIMITATIONS AND PERMISSIBLE RESPONSES:  FOURTH 
AMENDMENT INTERSECTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
While the First Amendment allows video recording police officers 
as constitutionally protected activity, that does not mean that any 
government reactions to it are inherently unconstitutional.  While the 
circuit court decisions involve police misconduct and claims of consti-
tutional violations, they stem from the type of reaction as opposed to 
the mere existence of a reaction.  While the act of recording exists on 
a spectrum of First Amendment activity, so do the permissible reac-
tions of police officers. 
While the First Amendment remains at the heart of the considera-
tion of the courts’ decisions, there are additional implications for 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  The Fourth Amendment, made 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, pro-
vides that the people are “to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, . . . and 
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”91  This 
amendment has been interpreted to allow various levels of police in-
trusion, ranging from brief questioning and frisking to full-blown 
searches and arrests.  Nearly every police interaction has the potential 
to scare civilian recorders, even in a way that has the potential to chill 
the valid speech occurring.  However, the fear of chilling speech 
cannot eliminate a whole array of Fourth Amendment law, nor 
should it forbid officers from acting in reasonable ways. 
The following parts examine the legality of reactions generally 
permitted within the Fourth Amendment and some potential issues 
that arise at the intersection of the First and Fourth Amendments. 
A.  Approaching a Recorder with No Further Actions 
Police officers are granted the authority to randomly approach 
any individual in a public place, ask them questions, and request con-
 
 91 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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sent for further police conduct.92  As long as a reasonable person 
would understand that he or she is free to choose not to engage with 
the officer and refuse cooperation, there is no higher standard of 
specificity or suspicion.93  The Fourth Amendment is not implicated 
when the activity is non-coercive and consensual.94 
This remains applicable with the civilian-recorder of the police of-
ficer.  There is nothing to stop an officer from approaching the civil-
ian recorder and engaging her in questioning, as long as the totality 
of the circumstances indicates to the recorder that he is in no way 
forced to answer.  The Fourth Amendment is not implicated in these 
exchanges as they are considered to be consensual.95 
There is an argument that merely approaching an individual 
could create a certain chill to the act of recording.  It is also possible 
that officers being recorded are more likely to approach and may 
even intend to intimidate recorders with the hope that they desist 
and that their speech is chilled.  The same could be said for any activ-
ity the individual is engaged in when approached by an officer re-
gardless of the legality of the actions.  It therefore seems unlikely that 
police would be forced to not acknowledge the presence of a camera 
as opposed to approaching and inquiring without force or intimida-
tion.  If the recorder were to choose to not respond or state that they 
do not wish to answer the questions, the officer would not be permit-
ted additional reaction or force.96  Just because the activity is legal and 
constitutionally protected does not mean it must go unnoticed. 
B.  Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion:  The Use of Protected Activity 
as a Basis for Greater Intrusion 
In order to conduct a full search or arrest, there must be probable 
cause.97  The Supreme Court found this to require “only a probability 
or substantial chance of criminal activity.”98  Establishing a threshold 
 
 92 See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431, 434 (1991) (acknowledging that “the Fourth 
Amendment permits police officers in random airport lobbies and other public places to 
ask [individuals] questions.”). 
 93 Id. at 431, 434. 
 94 Id. at 434. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98 (1983) (stating that “[t]he person ap-
proached . . . need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen 
to the questions at all and may go on his way.  He may not be detained even momentarily 
without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer 
does not, without more, furnish those grounds”) (internal citations omitted). 
 97 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 98 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983). 
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showing of probable cause allows the officer to arrest a person, con-
duct a search of that person incident to arrest, and occasionally per-
mit for searches of areas such as cars where there is probable cause 
that evidence does exist.99  In the alternative, officers are permitted to 
conduct a “Terry” stop if the officer has reasonable suspicion that a 
crime has occurred or is about to occur.100  This gives the officer per-
mission to briefly stop the individual to question him.101  If there were 
to be suspicion that the individual was armed and dangerous, it 
would allow the officer to conduct a brief frisk of the outside clothing 
for weapons.102  In both standards, reasonable suspicion and probable 
cause, innocent and completely legal behavior can and frequently 
does provide the basis for intrusion upon the individual’s privacy.103  
These same standards are applicable against the civilian recorder. 
In every Circuit Court case discussed in Part I, the officers argua-
bly had probable cause that wiretapping statutes or privacy statutes 
were violated through recording.  In each case all of the charges were 
dismissed.  An officer needs probable cause to arrest or reasonable 
suspicion to stop and frisk, but the question remains:  “probable 
cause of what?”  If the First Amendment protections of Freedom of 
Speech are to be taken seriously, then the mere act of recording a po-
lice officer while in a public place cannot constitute a crime, proba-
ble cause, or reasonable suspicion.  A line must be drawn between 
those “crimes” where the act of recording is the crime itself and where 
the recording is indicative of some other behavior or plan, which is 
criminal outside of the recording.  The former criminalizes political 
speech protected by the Constitution, whereas the latter falls within 
the permissible use of the legal activity of recording to establish 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion of some other non-video-
recording crime.  General and broad-reaching statutes such as the 
wiretapping and privacy statutes are not enforceable or applicable 
against the civilian recorder, and unnecessarily infringe on political 
speech by criminalizing it.  The Supreme Court has already held that 
statutes that criminalize protected speech under the First Amend-
 
 99 Id. at 243–46.  
100 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968) (“[T]he police should be allowed to ‘stop’ a per-




103 See Gates, 462 U.S. at 244 n.13 (1983) (“[I]nnocent behavior frequently will provide the 
basis for a showing of probable cause.”); Terry, 392 U.S. at 1 (1968) (finding that an of-
ficer’s reasonable suspicion warranted an invasion of privacy). 
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ment cannot stand.104  Narrowing the scope of the wiretapping and 
privacy laws to exclude the civilian recorder remains true to the Su-
preme Court’s position that speech protected by the First Amend-
ment cannot be criminalized.  
There are, however, still narrow cases in which recording is not a 
criminal offense but can be seen as evidence of some other criminal 
activity.  For example, when considering conspiracy and attempt 
charges, a civilian-recorder who was attempting or conspiring to 
commit an illegal act might, in his or her planning, video record the 
area or people targeted.  In this particular scenario, the people being 
recorded would be on-duty police officers.  While the act of video re-
cording is not a crime, the purpose of the video and the use of it as 
part of a criminal plan can provide evidence of a separate crime.  The 
act of recording when combined with other activities would be per-
missible evidence to provide support for probable cause and reason-
able suspicion.  The act of recording and the recorded image alone 
would be insufficient to establish probable cause or reasonable suspi-
cion without additional circumstances.  At this time, a case of this na-
ture has yet to arise and seems unlikely to arise.  Instead, cases so far 
have involved bypassers recording arrests. 
While allowing the legal activity to be used as evidence of a crime 
may have a chilling effect on protected speech, one that the Court 
frequently seeks to avoid, the same can be said for all legal activity 
that is considered in establishing the requisite Fourth Amendment 
intrusions. 
C.  Reasonable Limitations:  Time, Place, and Manner 
As noted by the Eleventh Circuit, speech is generally capable of 
content-neutral limitations based on time, place, and manner.  Such 
restrictions of protected speech are permissible if they are “narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant government interest,” and leave open 
alternative channels for communication.105  Impermissible govern-
ment purposes, such as the suppression of particular content or disa-
greement with the message, make the restrictions content-specific 
 
104 See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) (“[A]ny enforcement of a statute 
thus placed at issue is totally forbidden until and unless a limiting construction or partial 
invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutional-
ly protected expression.”). 
105 Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).  See also Ward v. 
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing Clark for the same).  
Oct. 2014] NO CALLING CUT 307 
 
and unconstitutional.106  For civilian recorders, these limitations can 
be particularly important.  Of special note in this situation is that the 
time, place, and manner restrictions must be neutral to the content 
of the speech, meaning that harsher restrictions cannot be imposed 
on the civilian recorder over the civilian observer, as the presence of 
a small recording device generally only makes the difference in creat-
ing a record.107  The following Parts consider (i) time restrictions and 
(ii) place restrictions.  Manner restrictions are not discussed in 
depth, as the manner in this particular Comment is video record-
ing.108 
1.  Time Restrictions for the Civilian Recorder 
Time restrictions may take two forms:  (1) limitations to the pre-
cise day, minute, and hour; and (2) limitations on duration of record-
ing.  The first is impractical, as it would require the civilian recorder 
to specifically know when events worthy of recording occur.  The 
most common situation for a civilian recorder is one mentioned at 
the opening:  an individual randomly observing a police interaction 
or arrest and deciding to capture it on video.  Prior planning is not 
an option.  Limitations on the amount of time spent recording are 
more likely, although also constitutionally disturbing. 
Under the Fourth Amendment, police officers are permitted to 
not only follow every step an individual takes as long as it occurs in 
public, but also use digital tracking devices such as beepers, even if 
the officers lack probable cause.  The Supreme Court readily dis-
missed these activities as intrusions of privacy because the public ac-
tivities and travels were readily visible to anyone who wished to see 
them.109  The court relied on the fact that travels were regularly ob-
servable to anyone as a basis for saying that there is no privacy inter-
est in activities conducted in public.  Limiting the amount of time a 
 
106 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; see also Clark, 468 U.S. at 294 (“[E]xpression . . . may be forbidden 
or regulated if the conduct itself may constitutionally be regulated, if the regulation is 
narrowly drawn to further a substantial governmental interest, and if the interest is unre-
lated to the suppression of free speech.”). 
107 Some will likely argue that the creation of a record is a significant variation.  However, a 
video record is only a more verifiable form of what is visually seen.  It is easier to convey 
to others, and limiting that speech is impermissible prior restraint, and based on the con-
tent of its message. 
108 For considerations on alternative manners, such as note taking or plain observation and 
their comparative inadequacies, see supra Part II(C).  
109 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).  But see United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 
961–63 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Fourth Amendment may limit 
police from following an individual for extended periods of time without reason). 
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civilian recorder can spend personally observing and documenting 
the actions of police officers flies in the face of this reasoning.  Mem-
bers of the public do not have to shield their eyes from the publicly 
accessible and readily viewable political actions of their government 
when the government is not forced to shield its eyes from its citizen’s 
public actions. 
2.  Place Restrictions for the Civilian Recorder 
Place restrictions are a realistic consideration for the civilian re-
corder.  Police officers have an important government interest in 
maintaining the safety of those around them, including their own 
safety as officers. They further have an important interest in main-
taining crime scenes.  All of these can impact the physical place a ci-
vilian recorder may be. 
As explained in the right to gather information part of this Com-
ment, there is no absolute right to access specific, restricted areas in 
the interest of gathering information.  Civilian recorders should be 
limited in the same way as any other observers should be.  No addi-
tional access should be granted, but no additional limitations should 
be placed on the recorder.  That is the best way to preserve speech 
with reasonable content-neutral limitations. 
Notable in place restrictions is the Supreme Court’s recent treat-
ment of buffer zones against protesters at abortion clinics.  The Su-
preme Court recently decided McCullen v. Coakley, a case questioning 
a 35-foot buffer zone around all reproductive health care clinics.110  
McCullen, an anti-abortion protester, claimed the buffer zone violat-
ed her First Amendment rights, in part because she was too far dis-
placed and unable to convey her messages to those entering the facil-
ities.111  The Court found the restrictions on location unconstitutional 
because they “burden[ed] substantially more speech than necessary 
to achieve the . . . asserted interests.”112  The Court recognized that 
moving protesters farther way was undoubtedly easier to protect pub-
lic safety and prevent harassment and intimidation.113  Nevertheless, 
the buffer was not narrowly tailored enough to address the valid con-
cerns; instead, the government “must demonstrate that alternative 
 
110 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).  
111 Id. at 2535. 
112 Id. at 2537. 
113 Id. at 2540. 
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measures that burden substantially less speech would fail to achieve 
the government’s interests.”114 
For civilian recorders, the place restriction holds similar concerns.  
While some concerns for safety may exist, an outright ban or an over-
ly large distance restriction inhibits more speech than is necessary to 
preserve safety.  McCullen also suggests that removing a recorder so 
far from the scene that nothing could be captured could be an in-
fringement of First Amendment Rights.  The permissible distance 
varies based on the precise situation and government concerns.  Thir-
ty feet may be enough for observing and recording an arrest when 
the arrestee was not resisting.  Additional distance would be needed if 
there were guns being waived.  Individual evaluations on a case-by-
case basis would be required. 
D.  Concerns for Officer Safety and Investigations 
It is nearly impossible to consider the civilian recorder without 
considering officer safety.  It is a concern many have, noting the need 
to protect our officers and preserve their investigative efforts.  As a 
hypothetical, imagine a civilian recorder who, after spending signifi-
cant time recording officers in publicly accessible and visible places, 
is able to discern the contents and strategy of an investigation.  Reve-
lation of the investigation to the public presents the possibility of ru-
ining any potential results, and even causing physical harm to confi-
dential informants.  The initial reaction is to create such a limitation 
whereby the recorder would not be permitted to obtain such infor-
mation or convey it to others. 
Such a response, however, contradicts well-established First 
Amendment decisions and constitutes prior restraint.  Indeed, “any 
prior restraint on expression [has] a heavy presumption against its 
constitutional validity.”115  In a per curium decision, the Supreme 
Court struck down an injunction prohibiting the New York Times from 
publishing classified information entitled “History of U.S. Decision-
Making Process on Viet Nam Policy.”116  The U.S. Government argued 
that publication of the information would endanger the United 
States, and publication should be halted to ensure safety.117  Yet, the 
court disagreed.  Justice Hugo Black’s concurrence stated, “[t]he 
 
114 Id.  
115 Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
116 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). 
117 Id. at 718 (Black, J., concurring). 
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word ‘security’ is a broad, vague generality whose contours should 
not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the 
First Amendment.”118  Justice Potter Stewart, in his concurrence, not-
ed the vast and occasionally unchecked powers of the executive be-
fore stating,  
[i]n the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in 
other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon execu-
tive policy and power in the areas of national defense and international 
affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry—in an informed and critical 
public opinion which alone can here protect the values of democratic 
government.119   
He noted that some of the documents “should not, in the national 
interest, be published.”120  Yet, it was still short of the necessary “di-
rect, immediate, and irreparable damage” needed to restrain the pro-
tected activity.  If the First Amendment can protect the New York 
Times and Washington Post in publishing the classified, strategic, exec-
utive decisions about the Vietnam War, because they were not con-
sidered dangerous enough, then there is no valid safety argument at 
play with the citizen recorder either. 
The limitation based on abstract considerations of safety, which 
may or may not ever occur, is nothing more than prior restraint.  In 
the average recording of an arrest, there is no evidence that the video 
recording will cause danger at the hands of the recorder or if the vid-
eo is released.  These concerns are unwarranted without a specific set 
of facts that would indicate otherwise to the officer.  Video recording 
itself, the capturing of moving images, does not pose a safety con-
cern.  Acts done in conjunction with video recording or circumstanc-
es surrounding the video recording may, on a case- and fact-specific 
basis, indicate otherwise.  However, a total ban because the mere pos-
sibility that that someone watching too closely may cause harm at 
some point in time is not enough to justify a ban on First Amend-
ment protected speech for every person in America. 
CONCLUSION 
Civilian recorders have a First Amendment right to engage in vid-
eo recording of their public officials, including police officers, while 
they perform their duties in public.  This right is not absolute, and no 
right ever is.  It has fine contours and will likely raise future constitu-
 
118 Id. at 719 (Black, J., concurring). 
119 Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
120 Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).  
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tional questions.  Yet, allowing recorders to be arrested for doing 
nothing more than monitoring the actions of their government is to 
penalize the public for remaining informed.  A well-informed elec-
torate is nothing but desirous, and recording assists in spreading that 
knowledge and information.  In conclusion, consider the ever-
eloquent words of James Madison:  “A popular Government, without 
popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue 
to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.  Knowledge will forever 
govern ignorance.  And a people who mean to be their own Gover-
nors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.”121 
 
 
121 Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).  
